


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**1975/12/02**

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the  
People's Republic of China  
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, PRC Foreign Minister  
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Foreign Minister  
Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office  
in Washington  
Lin P'ing, Director, Department of American  
and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs  
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department  
of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs  
Ting Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office,  
Department of American and Oceanic Affairs,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director, United States  
Office, Department of American and Oceanic  
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor, PRC  
Liaison Office in Washington  
Shih Yen-hua (Interpreter)  
Lien Cheng-pao (Notetaker)  
Sui Chu-mei (Notetaker)


Gerald R. Ford, President of the United  
States of America  
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
George Bush, Chief of the United States  
Liaison Office in Peking  
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State  
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff,  
Department of State  
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, *248*  
National Security Council

DATE AND TIME:

Tuesday, December 2, 1975  
10:10 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

SECRET - XGDS (3)  
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER



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PLACE: Great Hall of the People  
Peking, People's Republic of China

SUBJECT: Approaches to Dealing with the  
Soviet Union

(The press entered the room and photographs were taken.)

Vice Premier Teng: Have you solved the problem of jet lag yet?

The President: Our stop in Alaska was very helpful. It was a delightful evening last night -- very pleasant.

Vice Premier Teng: I hope you had a good rest last night.

The President: The long night was very helpful. It was very pleasant here this morning with the sun out. I am looking forward to going out this afternoon.

Vice Premier Teng: I hope you have the opportunity for a short excursion.

I hear that the foreign press has been commenting on my vice of chain smoking, so I have taken out a cigarette for them. (Laughter) Our Foreign Minister has the same bad habit I have. I tried for ten years to fight this habit, but I have always failed.


The President: If you don't mind, I will smoke a pipe.

Vice Premier Teng: I suppose people who don't smoke at all, like the Doctor, are the best people in the world. Those who smoke pipes are second best; and we who smoke cigarettes are the worst.

Secretary Kissinger: My wife smokes. Her nurse tried to help her stop. The result was that the nurse stopped, but she didn't.

Vice Premier Teng: It seems that heaven is helping us with your visit -- with the weather.

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The President: I was thinking this morning how beautiful it would be here in the springtime with the trees and the flowers. The shrubbery is very nice now, but in the summer it would be beautiful.

(The press was escorted from the room.)

Vice Premier Teng: Before we begin, I would first like to express on behalf of the Chinese Government once again our welcome to Mr. President and your party on this visit.

The President: Thank you.

Vice Premier Teng: Yes, and also the international situation has gone through ten thousand changes. Each of our countries are in different positions, and we believe it is beneficial for our leaders to have constant contact with each other and exchange views.

Yes, and since our two countries have different social systems we naturally have different views, but it doesn't exclude our searching for common points, searching for improving our relations on the basis of the Shanghai Communique.


And we believe in having deep exchanges on matters. It does not matter if we have different views or even if we quarrel sometimes. And perhaps the Secretary will remember that Chairman Mao once told him: small quarrels can lead to big unity.

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, on behalf of all the Americans who have come with me let me express our appreciation for your warm welcome and your gracious hospitality.

Let me bring up one point I mentioned as we drove in from the airport to the residence yesterday. If we are interested at all in the question of whether we should issue a public statement, we should turn this question over to the two Foreign Ministers. If we are going to have one, they can discuss it this afternoon or tomorrow.

Vice Premier Teng: I agree with that. Yes, we can leave that to those two who have always specialized in that work, including quarreling. (Laughter)

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The President: They are experts in that field.

Mr. Premier, let me say that the development of our relations since 1971, coming to this point, have had an historic significance. The American people are very supportive of the developments that have taken place in the last four years. After a period of some twenty years when there was little or no contact, and many periods of difficulties, the American people believe in and support the developments that have taken place.

We have to further our commitment to normalize our relations, but our two countries have to look at the broader international situation, as it affects not only our two countries but also the world as a whole.

We fully recognize that there are significant differences in our social systems. We do not believe that those differences should impede or interfere with our efforts to develop an understanding internationally. As you indicated, there are areas of disagreement, but it is important to discuss them calmly and objectively. There is an old saying from our Congress -- Ambassador Bush will remember this -- we used to say that you can disagree without being disagreeable.

Mr. Vice Premier, we feel that these discussions, whether between you and myself, or between the two Foreign Ministers, have to be conducted in periods of calm as well as in periods of difficulty. It should be a continuing relationship. In that way we can deepen it and strengthen it. We also feel that where we have a significant mutual interest we should work closely together, and where that interest is expressed by both of us we should continue to work together and not one withdraw after we have agreed to begin to pursue the same objective.

I would hope if we have any new ideas for discussion that we can open them up and have frank discussions concerning such areas. I would be very anxious to know from your side if there are such areas we can explore and discuss, and opportunities to work together?

Vice Premier Teng: We are willing to hear the opinion of Mr. President. And it is precisely proceeding from various points that Mr. President just mentioned that we attach importance to this visit. So perhaps we should go on as you suggested, into the first suggestion you made yesterday.

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The President: Let me say a few comments first if I may. The United States feels that our relationship has come a long, long way since its initiation several years ago. It indicates that we can cooperate and work for a better world -- to prevent the expansionism that others may have as their objective.

The efforts that were made in 1971 and 1972 by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger show great wisdom and courage in the renewal of those relations and normalizing them. The security of your country and our country can be enhanced by the movements which have taken place in these last three or four years. This relationship must have a growing vitality. This gives us an opportunity to discuss the broad international issues as well as our commitment to normalize our relations.

Let me assure you, Mr. Vice Premier, that the United States does not consider the People's Republic of China as the fifth in our list of priorities. We, of course, do feel that our relations with other nations are important, but we attach a special significance to the relationship that we have with the People's Republic of China. As you mentioned [in the welcoming toast], I have on a number of occasions said publicly in the United States how important I feel this relationship is. Many outstanding diplomats and distinguished world leaders have told me that one of the most significant diplomatic efforts certainly in many, many years was the resumption of our relations.

Despite this breakthrough and the significance of it, as I said earlier, I do not think we should disguise our differences. But our areas of agreement are important and give us an opportunity to work more and more closely as we work to develop a world of security and peace on a global basis. Since the 1940s, the United States has opposed expansionism, hegemonism, whether territorial or economically. An equitable world system must be founded on a basis of mutual understanding and economic prosperity, and I can assure you we are anxious and willing to discuss all aspects of this situation which are of mutual interest to our people as well as yours.

And may I say that the American people believe that our best interests depend upon us being strong at home and cooperative abroad. The United States will maintain its strength, and it will seek to broaden

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its interests diplomatically and through economic cooperation. We will consult and not confront as we work to maintain security and world peace.

The American people and this Administration, Mr. Vice Premier, feel very strongly that we should resist expansionism whether it should be in Europe, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, or elsewhere. And I believe there is solid evidence that we will resist expansionism by other countries whether militarily, economically, diplomatically, or whatever. The American people will resist expansionism anywhere in the world. And we look forward to working cooperatively with other nations that share our views about the expansionism of any other nation.

Vice Premier Teng: We are equally interested in exchanging views on such issues of broad range. And I believe Mr. President and other American friends must have taken note of what I said in the toast last night. There are many points in common between our two countries. And as we have said many times, and especially Chairman Mao repeated many times, in the relations between our two countries there are bilateral issues, especially Taiwan, but the problems we consider most important are the international issues. Because now the issue that is confronting the people of the world is the international question, and especially the danger of war. And to speak frankly, the question we are mostly concerned with is Soviet expansionism.

On this issue, of course, we each have our own views which are not entirely the same. However, we feel it is always good for each side to put forward its views, to have a frank exchange which would enable the other side to further study the views put forth by the other. And that is also what we have expressed many times. The first words President Nixon said to Chairman Mao when he came to China were that he had come out of the self-interest of the United States. And we believe that such an attitude expressed by the American side of frankness and sincerity is the basis for having a frank exchange of views. As Chairman Mao once said to the Doctor, our common task that we face is how to deal with that SOB. (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: I thought he said "bastard." (Laughter)

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Vice Premier Teng: So the question that we have been discussing is how we should deal with this bastard. Which is the best way, the most beneficial way? And as we discussed last night at the banquet, this is both the most important point in common, and also a point where our differences are not small.

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, Secretary Kissinger has outlined on other occasions the complex but I believe understandable approach we are taking to this mutual problem. Our method of approaching the problem is one of negotiations and a very firm attitude backed up by firm and adequate strength. We feel that we have a sound policy in reaching that approach. You have a different approach, but the end result is the same: to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union whether it is to the East or to the West. We will resist in either direction.

We do not disguise or hide the fact that we are negotiating with the Soviet Union to stabilize the international system and to improve our bilateral relations. This is in our best interest in a context where in a conflict it might be very, very difficult to contain the resort to nuclear weapons. If we can reduce tensions, it enables us in the United States to mobilize the support necessary to be a vital force in resisting Soviet expansionism.


Even though we make this effort to relax tensions with the Soviet Union, and even though we seek to stabilize the international scene, let me assure you that we will resist expansion in either the East or West -- any military expansion by the Soviet Union -- and with our nuclear capability.

Let me conclude by simply saying that the decision on such matters is made by the President, and not by the American press.

Vice Premier Teng: May I say that we believe that it is necessary to have a full set of tactics for dealing with Soviet expansionism, a whole series of tactics. We also believe that tactics are guided by strategy and firmness of principle. Tactics should be flexible and with many aspects, but we also believe that if tactics should exceed a limit they

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affect strategy. This also includes an evaluation of the nature of the Soviet Union.

Of course, we are willing to first have the views of Mr. President on this issue.

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, we have no illusions about the objectives of the Soviet Union. The United States for a long period of time has forcefully met actions by the Soviet Union. We did so in the case of Berlin. In the Middle East we have effectively moved to reduce the influence, the impact of the Soviet Union. We have sought to do so in other parts of the world, and we will continue to do so.


The situation in Africa at the present time is a good example of how we meet the actions of the Soviet Union to expand its influence and control in Angola. The United States feels that wherever they seek an advantage, whether it is economically, territorially, or diplomatically, we will meet that challenge. I believe our record is very clear, and we shall do so in the future.

We seem to agree on an overall global strategy, and yet we may have differences as to tactics. We understand that on occasion our tactics are different from yours, and sometimes yours differ from ours. But there should be an understanding [of our different tactics], and if it is desirable we should integrate our tactics whenever possible.

It is important for the development of our tactics that we get the full backing of the American people. They have supported what we are doing in Western Europe and the Middle East. They believe in a strong national defense to resist expansion by others. Our tactics have to be understood by them, and that is why we have taken the initiative to strengthen our Western allies and we have taken the initiative in the Middle East. The American people believe it is the best solution in the world to have peace, and that is why they are supportive of what we are doing and what we have achieved, whether it is in one part of the world or another.

Vice Premier Teng: On this issue we were able to have a comparatively deep exchange of views when Dr. Kissinger was here last time. Especially Chairman Mao in his discussion with Doctor made clear our

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basic views. At that time Mr. Bush was also present, and I believe the President must have received a good report and the minutes of the conversation. We have always held that there exists at present the danger of a new war, and if it breaks out it will be a world war. We have always believed that in the contemporary world there are only two countries qualified to fight such a war, the Soviet Union and the United States; and we believe at present the danger comes from the Soviet Union.

As for the global strategic situation, we also feel that at present the United States is in a defensive position and the Soviet Union is in an aggressive position. We also feel that the contemporary situation is very similar to the state of affairs prior to the outbreak of World War II. To put it plainly, we believe that to a very great degree the Soviet Union has taken the place of Hitler.

The President: Mr. Vice Premier --

Vice Premier Teng: Of course, at the present time we are faced with the question of how to cope with Soviet expansionism and the danger of new world war. During the period before the Second World War, there was also a dispute and different opinions on how to cope with a similar situation. Then the main representatives of one approach were Chamberlain and Daladier. They took one set of steps -- one set of tactics. However, in England Churchill took an opposite approach. We believe at present there are many arguments and many opinions which are a basis for strategy; and the procedure [of the contemporary debates] to a great extent is similar to the points of procedure before the Second World War.

And we have noticed in the opinion of the world today that many people are naturally recalling the history of the period prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. Of course, there is also the argument that if Britain as a representative [of the West] had adopted a strong attitude against Hitler it could have stopped him. In the light of the present situation, if we think that by taking tactical measures against the Soviet Union we can prevent them from launching a new world war, we don't think that is probable [of success].

However, we believe that at that time [of Hitler] if the Western world represented by England had not adopted a policy of appeasement --

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as the Doctor has mentioned several times -- if Britain had adopted a different attitude when Hitler entered the Rhineland and Czechoslovakia, if the West had adopted a firm policy at that time in dealing with such events, then it would have been possible to hold Hitler back. That is [it would have been possible] to hold off for a certain period of time the outbreak of the war. If at that time the West had adopted a correct strategy and tactics, and had placed the stress on the strengthening of its own strength, and not tried to direct the evil waters of Hitler against the East, then the situation might have taken a different tack when the war broke out.

At the time that the war broke out there was only France who had a relatively strong defense -- the Maginot Line.

Secretary Kissinger: Unfortunately, it was at the wrong place.

Vice Premier Teng: The basic point is that the West had not made sufficient and appropriate preparations. Hitler maneuvered through Belgium and the Maginot Line collapsed. It was of no use at all; and at the same time Britain just made a great showing at Dunkirk. They just slipped away from the war.

And when we compare the present position of strength of the Soviet Union with that of Hitler at that time, we can see that Hitler was not in relation to the Soviet Union so very strong. And if we view the nature of the Soviet Union in the present day, as we see it -- although you may not see it this way -- we believe that in essence the Soviet Union bullies the soft and fears the strong.

In his day Hitler had to resort to blackmail. The Soviet Union is doing the same now. During his day -- the days of Hitler -- the West adopted a soft policy and Hitler a strong one, and he had a very great aim [strong objective]. At that time the West, represented by Britain -- aside from itself not making active preparations -- the West represented by Britain also directed Hitler to the East, and they took practical steps to feed Hitler to his full. In this way they strengthened him in the field of defense, and also in economics. And this also led to the strengthening of Hitler's preparations.

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The President: Mr. Vice Premier, let me comment. We agree with you that the Soviet Union in many respects is comparable to Hitler in the 1930s. But I think there is somewhat a different situation today. Under no circumstances will you find the United States in the 1970s adopting a similar position [to Britain's in the 1930s] now or in the future. The American people have learned the lesson that weakness invites war. And as a result, the United States is strong today, and we will continue to be strong not only in strategic weapons but in conventional weapons. We will continue to strengthen our relations with the Western allies including our nuclear capability.

I took a very strong stand in our meeting in Brussels this spring indicating that we would not permit Portugal to be a member of NATO if it was dominated by the wrong leadership. Now the situation has improved somewhat, and I believe this is clear evidence of our willingness to stand up to any erosion of our position in Western Europe.

We feel very strongly that the political situation in Italy must be strengthened; and we have been working very closely with the CDU in order to improve their political situation. It is vitally important that we continue to strengthen NATO. We also feel that it is vitally important to strengthen the other nations in the south and east in NATO -- Greece and Turkey. And I believe that we have been able to convince the Congress that Turkey is a strong and important ally and their strong and continued participation in NATO is in our vital interest. Also in Greece.

I am convinced that the people of the Western allies -- France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy -- feel as I do that they must improve their military capability, improve it and their resolve to meet any challenge that may come from the Soviet Union. I don't see any similarity now to the 1930s. We have greater resolve and military capabilities to oppose any country like Hitler. I believe that our record is very clear in resisting any territorial expansionism; and let me say we will continue such a policy. The recent investigations in the United States have brought out [the facts] that we did resist in Chile, in Iraq, in Portugal, and Italy. You should know from me that these investigations have not weakened our ability to act or eroded the will of the American people.

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We learned a lesson from the weaknesses of Great Britain in the 1930s. At that time the United States was unprepared; but having learned from World War II, we will be strong in nuclear as well as in conventional weapons. I have pointed out in the United States that military weakness invites aggression. And the American people are well aware of their history.

Our military budgets will continue to grow, and we will maintain the strength to meet aggressors. And no one should conclude that because of any investigations or Watergate that America is not prepared to meet its obligations strongly and forthrightly on a worldwide basis. During all of my time in the Congress, 25 years, I was known as a hawk not a dove!

Secretary Kissinger: Translate that into Chinese! (Laughter)

The President: That is an over-simplification, but what it indicates is that I believed then and I believe now that the best way to maintain peace and security is for the United States to stay strong and meet head-on the expansionists. This Administration is not pushing the Soviet Union to the East. We want to work with you to contain any expansionist efforts by the Soviet Union.

Vice Premier Teng: May I inquire whether or not you discussed during the conference at Rambouillet whether or not to adopt necessary measures from a strategic perspective to avoid strengthening the Soviet Union economically and in technique /technologically/?

The President: The principal purpose was to concentrate on strengthening the economic viability, the industrial capacity of five major industrial powers, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Italy -- and the United States. We felt it was extremely important that these six countries work together to strengthen their economic solidarity and to hasten the time when they all will come out of the present economic recession and strengthen our capabilities to meet the challenge in the economic area of the Soviet Union. We did not encourage our European friends to increase their economic activities with the Soviet Union. On the contrary, we urged them to slow down. We feel that the Western

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countries ought to be more reserved -- to slow down their economic relations with the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the Chinese side has to understand, Mr. President, that our credits to the Soviet Union were \$500 million over three years, and they were tied to specific projects which we can control. The Japanese and Europe have given \$5 billion on open-line credit which they have no way of controlling. And it is not correct that we are strengthening the Soviet Union technologically. We have just refused three applications for computers for Intourist which we thought they could use for weapons programs. Our grain sales have been designed to limit their strategic reserves by putting a ceiling on the purchases they can make in any one year.

Vice Premier Teng: According to our materials, from 1970 to the present day, the six countries that you mentioned at Rambouillet have provided to the Soviet Union around 200 major projects of technical assistance. And from 1970 their total credit to the Soviet Union has reached a figure of \$16 billion, and especially in the recent two years it has reached \$10 billion.

Secretary Kissinger: But very little from the United States.

Vice Premier Teng: We have also taken note of this example: It is said that the largest truck factory that Italy has assisted the Soviet Union in establishing -- it is named after Togliatti -- that the major amount of equipment in the factory, some say three quarters of it, is said to be of United States' technology. Perhaps the figures may not be correct, but it is said that the major part of technology belongs to the United States. And in the 200 projects which we have just mentioned which were undertaken by the six countries -- we may say five if we do not count the United States -- many of these projects are undertaken by multinational corporations. And it is said that among these, much technique [technology] is from the United States.

And in the grain aspect, I think it is the United States that is the major provider. And as we said to Doctor the last time, we believe the true strategic weakness [of the Soviet Union] lies not in its weapons but in its economic strength. Its weak points are that they lack sufficient

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grain, and they lack new technique [technology] and equipment in their industrial projects. And it is in this that the six countries are making up for their weaknesses, helping their war capability. That is what we are concerned about.

The President: On grain, in Helsinki Secretary Brezhnev asked to buy an additional 20 million tons. I put a lid on it -- stopped the sale of grain to the Soviet Union. They have purchased since that time four to five million tons. Consequently, as they have had a very poor harvest, they have had to substantially revise their effort to increase their supply of meat. This is also a result of our denying them the purchase of the 20 million extra tons.

As to the trucks, the United States refused to let the Ford Motor Company negotiate and construct a plant there. Following that, Fiat [of Italy] did move in and made the deal with the Soviet Union, but the United States did say no despite criticism at home. So we are minimizing our activities in the economic field, and will continue to do so.

Vice Premier Teng: Anyway, if we should say that in a capitalist society whether or not a certain company would want to, through such investment, earn money and gain profits -- that is proceeding from their own interest -- that is one thing. But the question is whether from a strategic perspective you believe that through such measures you can bind the Soviet Union and increase their technical reliance on the West. If we are to speak about balance between you and the Soviet Union, we believe this can tip the balance. That is, if you make up for the weakness of the Soviet Union by your own strong points, we do not think that would be beneficial strategically. While from figures the amount provided by the United States is relatively small compared to the other countries, we think the attitude of the United States is crucial as it will affect the five others.

When Chancellor Schmidt came here, I told him the following story: 1,700 years ago in China there were three kingdoms. The king of one of the three kingdoms -- this is in the story The Romance of the Three Kingdoms -- was the king of Wei. His official title was Wu Ti of Wei, the Martial Emperor of Wei. And his name was Tsao Tsao. He was a great military man, a great statesman, and a great man of letters.

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During this war of confusion between the three kingdoms, there was a general named Liu Pu who was the most outstanding and most courageous. During the war he was defeated and surrendered to Tsao Tsao. This general, when he surrendered, suggested to the king, "With your wisdom and leadership and my bravery in battle, we could conquer the world. May I lead the forces?"

But this man Liu Pu was a very controversial person. He had turned to many sides; he had made many reversals in his loyalty many times.

The King [Tsao Tsao] met another man who told him this general [Liu Pu] is like an eagle which when he is hungry will work for you, but when he is well fed he will fly away. And it seems to me that the present day Soviet Union is like that General Liu Pu: When he is well fed he will fly away. I said to Chancellor Schmidt, when you have fed the Soviet Union to its full it might not only fly away but it might fly back to take a peck at you. (Laughter)

The President: As I said earlier, at Rambouillet we told our European allies to be reserved in granting credits to the Soviet Union. The United States is not overly eager to give credits to the Soviet Union. We have been very limited in granting credits, but at the same time I think we should mention, Mr. Vice Premier, where we have tried to take strong action -- as we are doing now in Angola. You should sustain what you have been doing in Angola so that we can have a joint approach to containing the Soviet Union. I respectfully suggest that we try to meet these challenges in Angola. This is a place where we can work together in meeting the expansionism of the Soviet Union.

We have indicated how we have tried to meet these challenges. I would like to find out from you how you have met the challenges of the Soviet Union in Angola and Southeast Asia?! We have to have a joint effort economically, militarily, territorially, and otherwise.

Vice Premier Teng: We can continue with our views during the next session, not only on Angola but the Middle East.

Mr. President, to go back to the issue I just mentioned, the point is that we believe economic issues themselves are not necessarily economic

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issues. They are military and political issues. Because we feel there have been historical lessons. We have had the historical lesson of having had Hitler fed well before he launched the war; and among the nations that fed Hitler, perhaps it was the United States that fed him the most. And among the Western technique [technology] that is [now] provided [the Soviet Union] by the five countries, a sizeable amount is American technology. We believe that without your agreement they could not do this as the United States has the greatest say.

For instance, the question of exploiting Siberia: The Japanese have expressed a willingness to help the Soviet Union to tap its oil and natural gas. We said to the Japanese, if you want to help the Soviet Union then we do not think it of great strategic consequence; the strength of Soviet resources is of no great consequence to China.

But we also told the Japanese they should not go it alone but to work with the United States, because we believe that perhaps the United States would think it over as to whether it would be beneficial to launch into such a project. Because we believe that the strength of the Soviet Union in Siberia economically would of course result in strengthening it in a way in the East that it would be directed against not only China but also against Japan and the United States. Of greater importance is its [Soviet's] forces against the United States and Japan in the East. Of course, they are spear-headed against China, too.

The President: Mr. Vice Minister, you are correct that we have not encouraged the Japanese to proceed. We have been cautioning them to give it thought and we have not given any credits. As I indicated earlier, some of our allies ought to be more cautious in giving credits, and I am encouraging them not to be so forthcoming.

I suggest at our next meeting we hear of the direct efforts your country is taking to meet head-on the expansionism of the Soviet Union. We want to know your thinking. In periods of relative calm in the international situation, we should continue our discussion and work together, and not just during a period of crisis. And, Mr. Vice Premier, I would hope that the two Foreign Ministers could continue [in the future] to discuss not only these issues we discussed today, but others as well. It would indicate our concern with the international scene as a whole.

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Let me indicate that it is fair to say that when the United States takes strong action in the Middle East to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union, as we did in the 1973 war, we forthrightly met the challenge of the Soviet Union. Since then we have constantly sought to lessen the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. It is helpful for you to understand what we have done, and not to criticize us. We have lessened the influence of the Soviets among the Arab nations. It is not easy for us to understand why we are criticized for being forthright and strong. It is difficult for us to understand why we're criticized.

We have been talking about history, Mr. Vice Premier. It is true that the West made some mistakes against Hitler, but it is fair to say when Poland was invaded, the West did respond. History also shows that in the East the response came only after the invasion began. So we all made mistakes. Let's not repeat them in the future.

Vice Premier Teng: We can discuss this next time. Perhaps we should call it a day, otherwise our stomachs will make revolution. (Laughter)

Another small matter, Mr. President, before we leave. When we meet the press should we describe the meeting that the two sides had as a candid exchange of views on a wide range of international issues? We discussed the international situation in broad terms and had a candid discussion which was beneficial.

Secretary Kissinger: If we say "candid" it means that we were shouting at each other. (Laughter)

The Foreign Minister has to give us another adjective.

The President: Should we use "constructive"?

Vice Premier Teng: Then we can just say we had "beneficial" discussions.

Secretary Kissinger: "In a candid atmosphere!" (Laughter)

Vice Premier Teng: So, Mr. President, we would suggest since you are an early riser, we will meet at 9:30 tomorrow morning and at your residence. Is that acceptable?

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Secretary Kissinger: "Mutually beneficial."

The President: Very acceptable.

(The meeting adjourned.)

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